CO129-591-14 Military Administration- liaison with Chinese and American forces 11-4-1945 - 25-7-1945 — Page 63

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staff a few days ago that it was his intention to set up a school to train Chinese officers for civilian affairs administration. I trust that the General is not being rather too optimistic in taking on this very difficult task.

5. I agree generally with the conclusions drawn by Colonel Cowell under paragraph 4 of his memorandum, and more specifically with his sub-paragraphs (b) and (d). With regard to sub-paragraph (c), I think that, provided the Economic Liaison Officer is able to achieve satisfactory personal relations with the G-5 section as a whole, and with General Olmsted in particular, we may be justified in hoping for a ineasure of positive American assistance in such matters as the re-occupation of British properties as they are cleared of the Japanese. Any such assistance would be of real advantage and might be of major importance, particularly where ownership is challenged by an occupier.

6. On paragraph 4(d), my only comment is that it may be found that both Mr. Asquith and Dr. Needham may be able to provide useful suggestions to the procurement division of G-5, as they have acquired a considerable knowledge of the Chinese potential. The ground has, indeed, been very fully covered by the many American advisers who have recently investigated almost every aspect of Chinese economic life, but there may still be ideas available on the British side, and the Economic Liaison Officer would, of course, establish early and close contact with the officers both of the llied Supplies Executive and of the British Council Scientific Mission here.

7. Paragraph 4(e) of the memorandum raises a rather complex issue: the appointment of the Economic Liaison Officer will, of course, have to be notified to the Chinese authorities and I agree with Colonel Cowell's suggestion that he should work with Chinese organisations through the agency of the relevant division of G-5 least at first. Provided, however, that the forms are properly observod, I do not anticipate that there would be any difficulties on the Chinese sido; and in particular I feel that General Yu Ta-wei at least will prove to be understanding.

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8. I also agree generally with the recommendations made in paragraph 5 of Colonel Cowell's memorandum. On sub-paragraph (a) of that paragraph my feeling, as stated above, is that it would probably be better for the original directive to be drafted here in Chungking for submission to you and thus to other departments concerned in London.

With regard to paragraph 5 (b), I agree that it is important that information be made available as it is forthcoming; and the sooner a start can be made, the better it will be. You will no doubt consider how best to provide for the collection and communication of the information to be passed to G-5 from the London end. I believe, in this connexion, that prior to Pearl Harbour a considerable quantity of information was collected in Shanghai from British firms and sent to you: and I

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